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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

conditions imposed on the original license for Serra's existing pier
reserved MDE's continuing right to determine if a modification was
"minor," requiring an adjustment to the existing license, or "major"
requiring a new application procedure with MDE. According to the
appellate court, Serra's proposed structure was a "major" modification
and, therefore, MDE's denial of the boathouse was within its
regulatory authority.
Matthewj Costinett
MASSACHUSETFS
Fafard v. Conservation Comm'n of Barnstable, 733 N.E.2d 66 (Mass.
2000) (holding (1) a portion of town's wetlands protection bylaws,
which purported to protect the public's interests under the public
trust doctrine, were invalid; (2) state statutes regarding the regulation
of pier construction only established minimum statewide standards
and did not preempt local pier regulations; and (3) local conservation
commission had the authority to deny property owner's request to
build a pier).
The town of Barnstable ("Barnstable") enacted wetlands bylaws in
order to regulate work in and around wetlands more strictly than
Massachusetts's wetlands protection act, and to protect public trust
rights in trust lands. Pursuant to the town's wetlands bylaws, the
Conservation Commission of Barnstable ("Commission") had the
authority to issue and to deny permits for the building of private piers
and docks. In 1997, the Fafards, property owners, filed a notice of
intent with the Commission seeking permission to build a fixed pier
on the Eel River, a narrow coastal inlet. The pier would occupy more
than twenty percent of the width of the river in violation of Barnstable
pier regulations as adopted by the Commission, and would stand on
public trust lands.
After two public hearings, the Commission denied the Fafards'
application finding that the proposed pier would significantly impact
recreation and public trust rights. After the superior court affirmed
the Commission's ruling, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
granted the Fafards' application for direct appellate review. The
Fafards argued the bylaws and pier regulations of Barnstable were
invalid because only the state may act to further public trust rights.
The Fafards also asserted state statutes concerning the licensing of
structures and piers on coastal lands preempted the Barnstable pier
regulations on which the Commission based its decision.
The court agreed with the Fafards that, under the public trust
doctrine, only the state, or an entity to which the state has expressly
delegated authority, may act to further public trust rights. Under the
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public trust doctrine, the state holds shore lands in trust for the use by
the public and protects the public's right to fishing, fowling, and
navigation on the flats. As the state had not granted authority to
Barnstable to act on behalf of public trust rights, the court held the
portions of the Barnstable's bylaws that granted the Commission
powers to further the public's interest in trust lands were invalid.
Consequently, the court severed the section of the bylaws concerning
the protection of public trust rights.
The court disagreed with the Fafards' argument that state statutes
regarding pier regulations preempted the Barnstable pier regulations.
The court concluded the state statutes were not comprehensive and
only established minimum statewide standards regarding pier
regulations. Local municipalities were free to establish more stringent
standards in addition to the state laws, and to require a local permit, as
well as the state permit. The court held the Barnstable bylaws did not
frustrate the purpose of state regulations regarding licensing for the
construction of piers but furthered the interests that the legislature
intended to protect in enacting the state statutes. The legislature
granted local conservation commissions the authority to take
regulatory action to protect the recreational value of wetlands and to
act as a local advisory to the state Department of Environmental
Protection.
Because state statutes did not preempt the Barnstable pier
regulations, the court held the Commission had the authority to deny
the Fafards permission to construct the pier. The court sustained the
Commission's decision on the basis of powers granted by the
legislature to local conservation commissions to protect recreational
values, not on the bylaws which purported to give the Commission the
authority to act to further public trust rights.
Spencer L. Sears
MISSOURI
Rosenfeld v. Thoele, 28 S.W.3d 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
placement of debris, fill area, and tie wall on neighboring land
produced a cause of action for both trespass and nuisance).
Donald Rosenfeld ("Rosenfeld"), sued his neighbor, Virginia A.
Thoele ("Thoele"), alleging nuisance and trespass arising out of
Thoele's placement of debris, a fill area, and a tie wall on Rosenfeld's
land. Rosenfeld sought both an injunction and damages. Thoele
moved to dismiss. The trial court granted Thoele's motion to dismiss
without prejudice. The Missouri Court of Appeals determined it had
jurisdiction, reiterating that, generally, dismissal without prejudice was
not a final judgment and therefore not appealable.
Rosenfeld alleged Thoele entered upon Rosenfeld's land without

